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Abstract—Programmatic advertising operates one of the most
sophisticated and efficient service platforms on the Internet.
However, the complexity of this ecosystem is the main cause
of one of the most important problems in online advertising,
the lack of transparency. This lack of transparency leads to
subsequent problems such as advertising fraud, which causes
billions of dollars in losses.
In this paper we propose Ads.chain, a technological solution to
the lack-of-transparency problem in programmatic advertising.
Ads.chain extends the current effort of the IAB in provid-
ing traceability in online advertising through the Ads.txt and
Ads.cert solutions, addressing the limitations of these techniques.
Ads.chain is a communication protocol that provides end-to-end
cryptographic traceability at the ad transaction level. It can
be seamlessly embedded in ad-tags and the OpenRTB protocol,
the de-facto standards for communications in online advertising,
allowing an incremental adoption by the industry.
We have implemented the protocol and made the code publicly
available. We assess the performance of Ads.chain through a
thorough analysis in a lab environment that emulates a real ad
delivery process. The obtained results show that our protocol
adds delays lower than 0.25 ms per ad space on the web page
and a marginal delay of 0.8 ms on the intermediaries. These
results confirm its impact on the user experience and the overall
operation of the programmatic ad delivery process can be
considered negligible.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online advertising is a multi-billion dollar business. The
Internet Advertising Bureau (IAB) reported that the revenue
generated by online advertising was $107 B in 2018, with an
inter-annual growth rate over 16 % [1] in the first semester
of 2019. Besides, online advertising is the main source of
revenue of some of the most important Internet companies,
such as Facebook [2] or Google [3], which are fundamental
contributors to the Internet innovation.
Programmatic advertising operates one of the most sophis-
ticated and efficient service platforms on the Internet, which
allows to deliver tailored ads based on tens of parameters
(e.g., interests and online behavior of users, the context of the
website/mobile app) through a real-time auction process. The
overall process occurs in the order of hundreds of milliseconds
and runs on top of a very complex ecosystem depicted in
Figure 1. In particular, the process of delivering an ad from an
advertiser to a website or mobile app1 involves several players,
such as Demand-Side Platforms, Ad Exchanges, Supply-Side
Platforms, and Ad Networks. The revenue generated by the
impression of the advertiser’s ad is then split between the
website and the involved intermediaries.
The complexity of this ecosystem is the main cause of one
of the most important problems in online advertising, the lack
of transparency. This lack of transparency leads to subsequent
problems such as advertising fraud–which attracts between
5 % and 19 % of the overall online advertising revenue [4],
[5]–or misreporting of ad campaigns information to advertis-
ers [6], [7]. The online advertising industry has reacted to the
accusation of lack of transparency creating auditing companies
referred to as verifiers. However, in practice, these verifiers
also use opaque auditing techniques that do not help to solve
the problem [8], [7], [4], [5].
In this paper we propose Ads.chain, a technological solution
to the lack-of-transparency problem. In particular, we define a
communication protocol to provide end-to-end cryptographic
traceability at the ad transaction level. In Ads.chain, every
intermediary involved in the delivery process of an ad has
to include a digital signature in the messages passed to its
buy-side partner. The signature certifies the integrity and
non-repudiability of the parameters containing relevant infor-
mation. Therefore, each ad transaction produces a chain of
digital signatures including the identity of each of the involved
intermediaries and their actions. These chains of signatures
provide guarantees of full transparency since any illegal or
inappropriate action, as well as its perpetrator, can be identified
by auditing the chains. Besides, the design of the protocol as
a chain of signatures allows an incremental adoption by the
industry.
Ads.chain can be seamlessly embedded in ad-tags and the
OpenRTB protocol, the de-facto standards for communications
between intermediaries in the online advertising ecosystem.
Moreover, it leverages the existing Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) used for HTTPS communications to generate digital
signatures. Hence, the protocol is readily implementable in
the current ecosystem without requiring any modification,
lowering the entry barrier for its adoption significantly. We
1For clarity, we will refer only to websites where websites and mobile apps
are equivalent. Differences will be contemplated explicitly.
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Fig. 1. Overview of the programmatic advertising ecosystem. The arrows
represent the flow of messages in the ad delivery process.
have implemented the protocol and made the code available
through the following GitHub repositories [9], [10]. We assess
the performance of Ads.chain through a thorough analysis in
a lab environment that emulates a real ad delivery process.
The obtained results show that our protocol adds delays lower
than 0.25 ms per ad space on the web page and a marginal
delay of 0.8 ms on the intermediaries. These results confirm
its impact on the user experience and the overall operation
of the programmatic ad delivery process can be considered
negligible.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the operation of the programmatic online advertising
ecosystem. Section III introduces Ads.chain, our proposed
protocol to provide end-to-end traceability to individual ad
transactions in the online advertising ecosystem. Section IV
details the implementation of the proposed protocol and the
lab environment in which we test its performance as described
in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide an overview of the operation
of the online advertising ecosystem and relevant details of
ad-tag calls and OpenRTB messages, where our traceability
protocol will be embedded. Moreover, we summarize some
of the proven consequences of the lack of transparency and
discuss some of the proposals from the industry that partially
address this issue.
A. Online Advertising Overview
In its inception, online advertising mimicked the scheme
used in traditional media advertising, where advertisers and
publishers (i.e., owners of websites and mobile apps) closed
deals to show advertisers’ ads into a publisher’s websites
through either a direct agreement or involving just one inter-
mediary. In recent years, the model has rapidly evolved to the
known as programmatic advertising ecosystem where ads are
traded through a complex and heterogeneous set of automated
platforms, often individually and in real-time. These platforms
communicate among them in order to serve a suitable ad
for a predefined ad space on a web page (or mobile app).
The messaging mechanisms and protocols these entities use
to communicate with each other are fairly standardized and
described later in this section.
1) Programmatic Advertising Operation: When a user vis-
its a website, the HTML document of the web page is
requested from the web server of publisher.com. This HTML
document contains an ad-tag for every ad space the publisher
allocates on the page. Ad-tag is the term used for the HTML
code snippets containing the URLs to retrieve ad-related
content [11]. Each ad-tag contains a URL pointing to the
publisher’s ad server to which the user’s browser performs
an HTTP request starting the ad serving process. The URL of
the ad-tag contains information about the ad space.
Upon the reception of a request from the user’s browser,
the publisher’s ad server may enrich the request with infor-
mation about the user profile using proprietary information
or requesting it to a Data Management Platform (DMP).2
If the ad server finds a pre-configured ad campaign suitable
for the user’s profile, the user’s browser retrieves the pre-
configured ad from the advertiser’s ad server. These pre-
configured campaigns typically correspond to private deals
between advertisers and publishers. In case there are no current
pre-configured campaigns for the user’s profile, the ad server
forwards the ad request to a Sell-Side Platform (SSP) or ad
network. These traders try to sell the ad space through private
exchanges where only a selected group of buyers have access
to.
If the ad request is still not sold through these private chan-
nels, the publisher’s ad server will place the ad request in the
open market. This process is usually done through an SSP that
will forward the ad request to an Ad Exchange (AdX) [12].
The AdX launches a real-time open auction. To this end,
it sends a bid request message to Demand-Side Platforms
(DSPs). This bid request message includes information about
the ad space (e.g., type, size, and location in the web page),
the domain (i.e., the website or mobile app), and the user’s
profile and device. The DSPs are entities where the advertisers’
ad campaigns are pre-configured. Upon the reception of the
bid request, a DSP checks whether the parameters included in
the bid request match any of the pre-configured campaigns. If
so, they respond to the bid request with a bid response that
includes the bidding price as well as the ad-tag pointing to
the URL of the ad. Note that the ad can be hosted in either
the advertiser’s or the DSP’s ad server. Upon the reception
of the bid responses from different DSPs, the AdX runs an
auction. The AdX informs the winning and losing DSPs with
win and loss notice messages, respectively. Moreover, the URL
for retrieving the ad is forwarded following the inverse chain
of communication from the AdX to the user’s browser. The
advertiser’s (or DSP’s ad server) receives the URL request
from the user’s browser, and then it accounts the impression
as performed.
Figure 1 graphically depicts the process described above.
Note that the overall described process takes in practice less
2Note that DMPs can be queried from any other intermediary entity in the
ad delivery process.
2
<script
src="https://ssp.com/ttj?id=123e45b7"
type="text/javascript">
</script>
Fig. 2. Example of an ad-tag defining an ad space on a web page.
than a second, from which the auction process is restricted to
less than 300 ms in most AdX3.
2) Message Formats and Communication Protocols: The
complex procedure described above relays on the exchange
of different types of messages. We can differentiate two clear
parts in the overall programmatic process. On the one hand,
the sell-side involves all entities participating in the process
until the communication reaches the AdX: the publisher, the
publisher’s ad server, and the SSP. On the other hand, the buy-
side is formed by the DSPs. Finally, the AdX is the entity
communicating the sell and buy sides.
The communication between AdXs and DSPs in the buy-
side uses the Open Real-Time Bidding (OpenRTB) protocol,
which is a standard defined by the IAB and adopted by the
industry. The OpenRTB defines the format and order of mes-
sages exchanged between AdXs and DSPs (bid request, bid
response, win/loss notice, and billing notice). OpenRTB uses
HTTP as the communication protocol and JSON (JavaScript
Object Notation) format for data serialization. The latest oper-
ational version is v3.0. It was released in November 2018 and
includes a beta version of Ads.cert, a mechanism to provide
signed bid requests, which is one of the basic components
we leverage in our solution to create an end-to-end chain of
signatures per ad transaction.
The sell-side entities rely on ad-tags as mean to commu-
nicate with each other. The response to an ad-tag can be
another ad-tag or the final advertisement. The structure of an
ad-tag may vary depending on its function. They may include
JavaScript code to perform dynamic tasks at rendering time
or even a no script section for the browsers with JavaScript
disabled. The information about the ad impression–such as
iframe size, user’s profile, or the winning price–is embedded
in the URL’s query string, the URL part after the question
mark symbol (?). The parameters in the query string are in
the format of key-value pairs using an ampersand symbol (&)
to separate parameter pairs and an equal sign (=) between the
keys and their respective values. Figure 2 shows an example
of an ad-tag.
B. Lack of transparency and the fraud problem
The online advertising industry has managed to develop a
very efficient ecosystem able to deliver tailored ads involving
a real-time auction process in a few hundreds of milliseconds.
However, this technology development lacks appropriate, ob-
jective, and transparent auditing mechanisms. There is no way
to check the validity or veracity of the parameters that an
entity A passes to an entity B (through ad-tags or OpenRTB
messages). Moreover, advertisers are left out of the process,
3https://developers.google.com/authorized-buyers/rtb/start
and what they receive are processed reports summarizing the
performance of their campaigns, which has been reported to
be inaccurate [6]. Besides, this lack of transparency is the
fundamental cause of ad fraud, one of the most important
problems of online advertising. There are different reported
forms of ad fraud: from basic attacks using bots to visit web-
sites where ads are shown [13], [6] and even clicked [14], to
more sophisticated attacks using malicious software–referred
to as adware–that performs hidden visits to websites from a
user’s browser [15].
Pushed by advertisers’ concerns about the lack of trans-
parency, several independent companies have appeared in
the last years referred to as verifiers: e.g., IAS [16], Withe
Ops [17], DoubleVerify [18]. These companies use ad-tags
embedded in publishers’ websites, containers of ads such as
iFrames, or the ad creativity to monitor the delivery process
of individual ad impressions. However, these companies op-
erate in an opaque manner. They use proprietary technology
which has not been validated. Indeed, the effectiveness of
their technology has been questioned by research studies [8],
[7] suggesting that solving the fraud problem using opaque
auditing techniques is not an appropriate approach.
Given the lack of transparency, the fraud problem is not
isolated to artificial traffic to untrustworthy publishers. Recent
reports document high scale cases of counterfeit inventory
fraud. In this type of attack, fraudsters take advantage of
the impossibility to validate the veracity of the information
included in ad-tags or OpenRTB messages. Domain spoofing
is a well-known attack to introduce counterfeit inventory in the
programmatic ecosystem [19]. In particular, fraudsters launch
fraudulent ad requests from instrumented browsers claiming
they came from popular domains, referred to as premium sites,
where ad spaces are more expensive. The IAB Tech Lab has
proposed specific ad-hoc solutions to this alarming problem:
Ads.txt and Ads.cert.
The Authorized Digital Sellers Ads.txt specification,
launched in 2017, consists of a plain text file where publishers
publicly declare which are the traders (e.g., ad networks,
SSPs, and exchanges) they operate with. Hence, any player
can check whether the ad request comes from a valid trader.
This ad-hoc solution has obvious limitations: publishers not
adopting it and implies a blind trust in authorized sellers [20]
and authorized resellers that could have received the requests
through an unauthorized source [19]. Given the limitations of
Ads.txt, the IAB launched the Ads.cert specification, whose
beta version is included in OpenRTB 3.0. Ads.cert defines a
standardized mechanism by which the publishers can sign the
ad requests using public-key cryptography to provide proof of
their identity. Although this step goes in the right direction
to address the counterfeit inventory, it is not an end-to-end
solution to provide full transparency to ad transactions and has
limitations as recognized by the IAB in Section 6 of the same
specification4. For instance, the current definition of Ads.cert
introduces a new vulnerability: it allows a malevolent platform
in the selling chain to replicate signed ad requests originated
4https://github.com/InteractiveAdvertisingBureau/openrtb/blob/
master/ads.cert:%20Signed%20Bid%20Requests%201.0%20BETA.md#
6-limitations-and-abuse-vectors-
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at a compromised user’s browser. The replicated ads can be
sold to different buyers or even to the same DSP if appropriate
sanity checks in the received inventory are not performed.
Extending these initial efforts by the IAB, we define
Ads.chain, an end-to-end solution that enables full traceability
of each individual ad transaction. Our protocol provides a more
dynamic solution than Ads.txt to mitigate the possibility of
introducing counterfeit inventory and extends the signatures
defined in Ads.cert to the complete chain of custody of each
ad transaction to avoid vulnerabilities, such as the replication
of ad requests.
III. Ads.chain PROTOCOL DESIGN
In this section we describe in detail Ads.chain. We start
identifying the requirements the protocol has to meet to
achieve its purpose (end-to-end traceability of ad transac-
tions) while being implementable in the current programmatic
ecosystem. Then, we describe the protocol, and finally, we
describe how to seamlessly integrate it into the current online
advertising ecosystem.
A. Protocol Requirements
• Unequivocal custody: In an ad delivery process, only
one player has the right to re-sell the ad space at a time,
following the scheme described in Figure 1. In other
words, only one player has the custody of the ad at a given
moment. In the current ecosystem, a malicious player
may declare to own the custody of an ad space, and there
is not an easy way to prove if it is true or false. Hence, the
defined protocol must guarantee the unequivocal custody
principle by which it will be verifiable if a player owns
the custody of an ad.
• Non-repudiability: any action taken by a player can
be undeniable. This property is referred to as non-
repudiability in the security discipline.
• Low latency: the overall ad delivery process takes
hundreds of milliseconds in programmatic advertising.
Therefore, the protocol must incur delays in the order
of a few ms to have a minimal impact on the overall
delivery process. On the other hand, the impact on the
overall page loading time should be likewise small to
avoid affecting the end-user experience.
• Scalability: the online advertising ecosystem delivers
around a trillion ads every day. The protocol must be
able to operate at this scale.
• Seamless integration: the protocol must allow its inte-
gration as part of the existing protocols and methods in
online advertising without the need to modify them. In
particular, it must be implementable in ad-tags and as
part of the OpenRTB protocol, the two methods used for
communication in the sell- and buy-side of the online
advertising ecosystem, respectively.
• Online and offline auditing: the protocol must allow
two types of auditing operations. On the one hand, online
auditing that enables an entity to audit the validity of a
received ad transaction in real-time. On the other hand,
each ad transaction must create a log that can be audited
in the future, so that misbehaving players can be identified
at any moment in the future.
B. Protocol Overview
In essence, an ad transaction can be defined by a chain
of individual actions taken by the involved players in the ad
delivery process (See Figure 1). These actions are, in many
cases, subject to the terms of a contract signed between two
entities.
We propose to generate a digital chain that records the
actions of every player involved in an ad transaction. Concep-
tually, the chain is formed by blocks. Each block is inserted in
the chain by a player participating in the ad delivery process
and summarizes the most relevant parameters associated with
the actions taken by the player. Moreover, the block is signed
with a private key that unequivocally identifies the player.
Finally, a block is linked with the previous block to form the
chain.
Following this simple protocol, the actions of the first player
in the ad delivery process (i.e., the publisher) are recorded
in the first block of the chain. This first block includes:
1) An universally unique identifier of the ad transaction. 2)
Information identifying unequivocally the player to which the
custody of the ad will be assigned so that this player is the
unique one with rights to re-sell that ad. This identifier is
the player’s domain name. 3) A foolproof identifier of the
user to let the advertiser verify the final destination of the
ad impression. This identifier is the IP address of the device
requesting the ad. 4) Data fields, which are key-value pairs,
where the actions of the publisher are registered. For instance,
these may include the location of the ad space on the screen
and the size of the ad space. Once all these data are compiled
in the proper format, the publisher signs this block with its
private key (note that the correspondent public key is publicly
available). Then, the block is generated and sent to the second
player in the chain indirectly through the user browser.
The first action of this second player (e.g., an SSP) upon
the reception of the first block is to verify the signature. If the
signature is correct, it generates a second block. Otherwise, it
rejects the ad transaction and informs about it to the publisher.
This second block is simpler than the first block. It includes
the signature of the first block creating the binding between
blocks to form the chain. In addition, it includes the key-value
data fields recording the relevant information associated with
the actions taken by the SSP as well as the identity (domain
name) of the third player to which the custody of the ad will be
delegated. These data are signed with the private key of the
SSP, and thus, the second block is created. The chain, now
formed by two blocks, is sent to the third player.
If the ad delivery process involves n players, the chain will
have n blocks. From the second to the last block, all have the
same format described in the previous paragraph. The only
differences among blocks 2 to n correspond to the data fields
(key-value pairs), which may be different for different types
of players (e.g., the data fields from an SSP and an AdX
might be different). The first block is the only one having a
different format since it includes the ad transaction id and the
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IP address of the device, as described above. The last block
of a chain will be typically generated by the DSP, winning
the last auction related to the ad transaction. Note that the
advertiser winning the ad space associated with the transaction
can verify the complete chain5 to audit that no information has
been tampered during the process. Moreover, the ith player in
the chain can validate the blocks of players 1 to i−1. Hence, a
malicious player in position i, which tries to modify previous
blocks, can be easily identified by the advertiser or any player
from position i+1 since the signature of the modified blocks
will be incorrect.
In the previous paragraph, we are considering a distributed
auditing scheme where advertisers take the responsibility of
auditing its own ad transactions. Alternative auditing schemes
can be defined, e.g., a centralized auditing entity that receives
the chains and performs a central auditing process, an auditing
entity defined by publishers to validate the ad transactions
associated with its websites. Note that it is up to the industry
to choose the most appropriate auditing approach.
Finally, it is worth noting that this simple protocol meets
the requirements defined above:
• unequivocal custody: only one player has the right to re-
sell the ad at each step of the process.
• non-repudiability: every action reported by a player is
recorded and signed with its private key. If a player is
taking inappropriate actions, it would be registered and
can be proved later.
• low latency: an entity executing our protocol needs to
perform a hash and a signature, which in principle are
simple actions. We explore this specific aspect in detail
in Section V.
• scalability: the protocol operates at the level of individual
transactions with low latency guarantees (See Section V)
so that its scalability is guaranteed.
• seamless integration: as we will show in Sec III-D, our
protocol can be implemented with both ad-tags (used
by sell-side entities) and OpenRTB (used by buy-side
entities).
• online and offline auditing: our proposal allows a player
that receives the custody of an ad transaction to audit the
received chain in real-time. The player can then reject
the transaction if there is any problem with it. Offline
auditing is also possible using the chains associated with
finalized transactions.
C. Protocol Details
In this subsection, we provide further technical details about
the design of the protocol.
1) Unique identifier of ad transaction: The transaction
identifiers need to be unique within each publisher domain.
Popular websites are typically served from a distributed in-
frastructure of servers (e.g., a Content Distribution Network
-CDN-) and thus would require to generate concurrent identi-
fiers from multiple servers. Therefore, they need a systematic
5We are assuming that DSP will deliver to the advertisers the chains
associated with its delivered ads.
scheme to generate identifiers at high throughputs without
collision.
In OpenRTB 3.0 and Ads.cert, the IAB mentions the need
for having a unique transaction identifier to avoid replay
attacks. However, it does not describe a format for it. We
propose to use the Universal Unique Identifier (UUID) format
described by RFC 4122 [21]. It is a well known and widely
used standard for UUIDs, and there is available code to
generate it in multiple programming languages.
A timestamp-based UUID is formed by 128 bits codifying
three fields: a high-resolution timestamp (60 bits), a clock
sequence (14 bits), and a node ID (48 bits). Popular domains
present a high rate of ad requests. To meet this and future
higher demands, we propose to provide a resolution of 1 ns.
To this end, we borrow 7 bits from the clock sequence and
assign them to the timestamp. That adjustment leaves another
7 bits for the clock sequence so that we can have up to 128
processes generating timestamps on a single server. With this
format, the theoretical limit of the number of UUIDs per server
is 128 billion per second. Similarly, we can codify timestamps
up to the year 5623 if we use the UNIX epoch. Hence, it offers
enough resolution and scalability to implement it even in the
aforementioned distributed architectures such as CDNs, which
may be serving tens of thousands of different domains.
In Ads.chain, we use the string representation of UUIDs–
hexadecimal values of the 16 bytes (128 bits) separated
with dashes after the fourth, sixth, eighth, and tenth byte–as
transaction UUID and refer to them as tUUID. The tUUIDs
will be generated by the publisher and tied to the ad transaction
since the first signature block.
2) Blocks codification: A block in our protocol is formed
by a set of data fields (key-value pairs) and the identity
(domain name) of the next player in the chain, which is also
represented in the format of a key-value pair. These data are
certified by the digital signature of the player that generated
them, which is also part of the block.
In order to include the block information in the ad trans-
action data, we only need to include three strings at every
step: the custody field specifying the entity to which the sell is
delegated, a keys-string that concatenates the keys of the fields
included in the signature–separated with a special delimiter
character–and the signature string codified in base64. The data
signed is a string with the values corresponding to the keys in
the keys-string, in the same order. Note that we do not need
to include this string in the request as the values are already
included in the request data, but we need the keys-string to be
able to form it. The signatures are performed over the SHA-
256 hash digest of the string representation of the block.
3) Handling Auction Processes: In an auction process, the
custody of the transaction cannot be delegated until the process
is concluded, and the winner of the auction (which will be the
one receiving the custody delegation) is known.
Therefore, the entity launching the auction does not delegate
the custody initially. Instead, it provides a temporary chain
where its last block includes a temporary signature. This
chain allows the participants in the auction to validate that
the auction is run by the entity (usually an AdX) owning the
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custody of the ad, as well as to check the information included
in previous blocks.
When the auction is completed, the winner entity will
receive the OpenRTB billing notice message, including the
final chain of blocks that delegates the custody of the ad on
the winner entity. The last block of this chain includes the
domain name of the winner entity in the corresponding field.
If the auction corresponds to the last event of the ad delivery
process, the winning entity, typically a DSP, generates the
last block of the chain. This block signed by the DSP should
include information regarding the advertiser, campaign id, and
creativity associated with the ad delivered to the user.
4) Publisher signature in mobile apps: Ads.chain is de-
signed to work independently of ad transactions on websites
or mobile apps. However, transactions in mobile applications
start on the user device with a request generally to a sell-
side platform instead of to a publisher’s server. In this case,
the app creates the Ads.chain block and requests a trusted
server of the app’s publisher to sign it before sending it to
the next intermediary in the custody chain. Note that many
apps already interact with their backends, so adding this
functionality requires low development effort.
D. Seamless Integration
Ads.chain can be seamlessly integrated into ad-tag calls and
OpenRTB, which are the de-facto standard communication
techniques used in the sell and buy sides of the online
advertising ecosystem, respectively. Both ad-tag calls and
OpenRTB messages specify the parameters in key-value pairs.
Hence, we can embed the block fields (i.e., signature, custody,
and keys-string) while maintaining the compatibility with
current implementations. Specifically, in the ad-tag’s URL,
the parameters are appended to the query string as there is
no hierarchical structure. Whereas, in OpenRTB objects, the
fields should be included in the Source object, as it is proposed
in OpenRTB v3.0 for Ads.cert [22].
Entities not implementing Ads.chain would only need to
ignore the associated fields. However, these entities would
generate a gap in the chain of custody since they will not
generate a block in the chain. We conjecture that with the
incremental adoption of our protocol, entities failing to imple-
ment it may be penalized in different manners. Some players
may pay less for ad transactions having gaps in the trust chain
due to the associated trust issues. Other players may directly
reject ad transactions that do not implement Ads.chain end-to-
end. These penalties may be an incentive for a faster adoption
of the proposed protocol.
Finally, we propose to use the private/public key pairs from
the existing Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) on the web that
gives support to HTTPS communications. These keys will
serve to sign the blocks (with private keys) and perform
signature audits (with public keys). Note that HTTPS is largely
adopted by most players in the online advertising ecosystem,
and they could implement our proposed protocol with their
current keys.
E. Trust chain example
Figure 3 shows an example of how the final chain received
by an advertiser looks like. Moreover, in the following link6
can be accessed the format of the chain received by the
different players of an ad transaction example involving a
publisher web server, an SSP, an AdX, and a DSP winning
the auction process and delivering the ad.
F. Ads.chain vs. Blockchain
Every ad transaction produces a chain of signature blocks.
The demanding time constraints for delivering ads to users in
real-time make impractical annotating these individual signa-
ture blocks of a chain as entries of a blockchain distributed
ledger. Blockchain inspired solutions are more suitable for
offline (not real-time) processes in the context of online
advertising. For instance, they can be used for the verification
of authenticity and uniqueness of the Ads.chain transaction
chains.
6https://github.com/apastor/ads-chain-cpp-platforms/tree/master/
ads-chain-examples
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Fig. 4. Image of the landing page of the mock website7 used for the publisher.
The image only contains 1 ad space with ad-tag written in red in the frame.
IV. Ads.chain IMPLEMENTATION AND LAB PROTOTYPE
To test the viability and performance of the proposed proto-
col, we have built a lab scenario with the main entities present
in the delivery of ad transactions in programmatic advertising.
We also implemented an external library that offers all the code
components required to implement Ads.chain by any of the
platforms involved in an ad delivery process. Both the entities
of the lab prototype and the library are implemented in C++,
and their associated code is publicly available on GitHub [9],
[10].
A. Lab Prototype of Online Advertising Ecosystem
We have reproduced in our lab prototype a scenario similar
to the one depicted in Figure 1. In particular, it is formed by
a publisher’s website server, a sell-side entity acting as the
publisher’s SSP, an AdX connecting the sell and buy sides,
and a DSP as the buy-side entity. There is also an ad server
for serving the final ad to the user’s browser upon the reception
of the ad-tag of the auction winner.
We deploy each entity in independent instances in a pri-
vate OpenStack with two compute nodes. The platforms are
implemented using a common base structure: Nginx [23] as
the HTTPS server connected with FastCGI to a Cppcms [24]
backend in C++. As we are not interested (for our purpose) in
any dynamic functionality on the DSP’s ad server, we serve
the ads static files directly with Nginx from the ad server.
We decided to use C++ as the programming language to have
a better estimation of the optimal performance that can be
achieved with a simple implementation.
As we propose to use the same keys for HTTPS and
Ads.chain, we create a PKI with OpenSSL [25] and sign the
certificates with the same Certificate Authority (CA), installed
in all of the entities as trusted. The CA is also installed in the
web browsers and added to curl in our tests.
For the sample website, we modified a static website
template7 adapting it to the Model-View-Controller pattern of
Cppcms to generate dynamic content. We use parameters in the
query string to customize the petition to the publisher’s web
server. This is the mechanism we use to control the number of
ad-tags included in the response, whether to sign the requests,
and a test id to include in the server-side logs to conduct
our performance analysis (See Section V). All the parameters
are optional, and the server returns by default one signed ad-
tag. As the layout of the returned ads is not relevant for our
purpose, the ad-tags are included as elements of an HTML
list that the CSS will present with three elements per row in
the lower part of the page. Figure 4 shows the landing page
of the sample website used for the publisher.
The programmatic platforms are implemented as Cppcms
servers as well. Their first task upon the reception of a request
is to check if the fields with signatures are present in the
request. If they do, they operate accordingly to the Ads.chain
specification described in section III. If not, they process the
request following the basic procedure of the platforms without
signature verification.
The auction process in the ad exchange is simulated by
launching the bid request to the DSP asynchronously. After
120 ms, the ad URL is extracted from the DSP’s bid response
and returned to the SSP. Upon responding to the SSP, the ad
exchange sends the billing notice to the DSP, updating the
signatures to certify him as the winner of the auction and, in
turn, delegating the custody of the ad transaction process.
B. Ads.chain library
The C++ Ads.chain library provides classes and functions
for the cryptographic operations, network-related functionality,
generating UUIDs based on the Unix timestamp, and logging
times of execution. We use this library to implement the
protocol in the publisher’s web server and programmatic
platforms.
The library uses CMake for building the source and Co-
nan [26] for dependency management. The main dependencies
of the project are OpenSSL 1.1.1 [25] for the cryptographic
operations, RapidJSON [27] for the data structure of the ad
transaction information, the Boost Uuid module [28], and
Poco [29] for caching, the HTTP requests and the logging.
We also use Google’s Fruit [30] for dependency injection. In
this section, we describe at a high level the design choices
we made for the different functionalities implemented in the
library to be used by the programmatic platforms. The library
is available in a Github repository [9]. The interested reader
can refer to the project repository for low-level details.
- The crypto submodule of the library provides C++ wrapper
classes to OpenSSL. As an entity always signs with the same
key, the Signer class receives the private key as a parameter
in the constructor. The Verifier class, as is expected to verify
signatures from different domains, will receive the public
keys directly in the verify function. We have C++ high-
level wrapper classes for the OpenSSL key structures that are
especially handy for managing the cache of public keys.
7the website template is obtained from freewebsitetemplates.com
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- The network submodule has classes for retrieving and
caching the public keys. The public key service caches the keys
using the Poco Least Recently Used (LRU) cache with time
expiration. If a key is not present, a data access object opens a
brief SSL connection to the HTTPS port of the target domain
server to retrieve and validate its HTTPS certificate. When a
public key is requested to the domain, the public key service
adds it to its cache. The network submodule also has functions
to make HTTPS requests that return the body of the response
and functions to transform query strings into RapidJSON
document objects and vice versa. The programmatic platforms
can use GET calls when the ad transaction parameters are
encoded in the query string (generally on the sell-side) and
POST calls when using the OpenRTB JSON objects. Besides,
the submodule also has a handy function to re-create the string
that was signed at a given level of the chain of custody. The
fields that this function adds to the string are extracted from
the keys-string field, so that it can be applied to any block
in the chain, independently of the information signed by the
platform generating each specific block.
- The tools submodule provides a time-based UUID generator
and two stopwatch classes for taking time execution measure-
ments. The UUID generator uses the Boost Uuid format [28]
and follows the style of the generators of the library. We im-
plemented it given the lack of a time-based generator in Boost.
The first stopwatch is semi-automatic and logs the elapsed time
from the object instantiation to the call to the stop function.
The other stopwatch is fully automated using RAII (Resource
Acquisition Is Initialization) [31] to compute the time between
the object construction and destruction. Both stopwatches use
the logger passed as argument to their constructor and allow to
set extra fields for additional information of the configuration
for which the times are taken.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Ads.chain may slightly increase the processing time to
render a web page since it forces to generate the ad transaction
id, create a block, and sign it. Likewise, the processing time
of ad transactions in programmatic platforms (SSPs, AdX, and
DSPs) may increase with the use of Ads.chain due to the need
to create a block and its associated digital signature.
As described in Section III-A, the extra delay incurred by
Ads.chain must be limited to guarantee a negligible impact in
(1) the load time of web pages–since it has been reported that
a high page load time affects directly to user experience [32]–
and (2) the overall time required to deliver an ad in the
programmatic ecosystem. Increasing the delay associated with
the delivery of programmatic ads may reduce the number of
ads that are in practice rendered in web pages (and mobile
apps).
In this section, we leverage our lab prototype and the
specific functions implemented in the Ads.chain library (See
Section IV-A) to evaluate the additional delay introduced
by Ads.chain in the page serving time and the processing
time of the ad transaction in programmatic platforms. To
this end, we run experiments with and without Ads.chain
and compare the obtained delays. Note that we measure the
server processing time instead of taking measurements in the
client since client measurements depend on additional factors
unrelated to Ads.chain.
It is important to highlight that in our evaluation, we are
assuming that Ads.chain executes sequentially to the rest of
actions run by the web server or programmatic platforms,
and thus we are reporting marginal delays for a worst-case
scenario. In the real world, a server’s backend performs
multiple tasks in parallel and asynchronously. Therefore, in
practice, implementing Ads.chain will be transparent in terms
of the delay as backends generally perform slower operations.
A. Page Serving Time Delay in publisher’s website
We define the Page Serving Time as the time between the
instant the web server receives the query from the browser
and the instant when the web server sends the page to the
browser. As discussed in Section III, publishers implementing
Ads.chain include the ad-tags with their signatures on the
requested web page, and signatures are created upon the
reception of the request in real-time because they include
information linked to the user making the request. Therefore,
this metric allows us to objectively measure the impact that
Ads.chain has on the overall page load time, and thus on the
user experience.
We measure the increment in the page serving time in-
troduced by Ads.chain’s signed ad-tags on a web page. We
conduct our evaluation for different web server sizes. We run
stress tests launching the server of our example website on
instances of 2, 4, 8, and 16 vcpus from our private OpenStack
(See Section IV-A). Moreover, as the signature has to be done
for every ad-tag, we conduct tests for various numbers of ad
spaces per page, from 1 to 30. We indicate the number of
ads and whether to use signed ad-tags with parameters of
the query string explained in Section IV-A. For launching the
requests, we use another powerful server in which we run the
curl petitions with several levels of concurrency to generate
different throughputs. Specifically, we do 10 thousand curl
petitions for the following configurations of parallel requests:
4, 8, 16, and 24, obtaining approximate throughputs of 180,
390, 550, and 870 requests per second.
The execution time of every request of the tests is logged
at the server with an additional parameter to identify the test.
Then, we compute the times’ percentiles for both runs of
every test, with and without signed ad-tags. Figure 5 shows
the increment in page serving time added by Ads.chain for
the 50 and 95 percentile in every test for the least and
most stressful throughputs. The results indicate that Ads.chain
introduces overall delays below 5 ms, even in the most stressful
considered scenario (30 ads per web page and 870 requests per
second). A more detailed analysis of the results shows that, as
expected, when the process of every request is done on a single
thread, the increment in latency is linear with the number of
ads, unless the server gets saturated. Moreover, we observe
that the overhead introduced for the generation of UUIDs is
in the order of µs.
Based on these results, we conclude that the impact of
Ads.chain is transparent for the final user. These results on
the publisher’s signature times are also valid for Ads.cert.
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Fig. 5. Marginal delay’s increment on the page serving time introduced by Ads.chain at the publisher. The times are given for different number of ads per
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Fig. 6. Processing time at the SSP because of the adoption of Ads.chain.
The times are measured for the different functions of the protocol and are
accumulative, i.e., the signing time includes the verification time and the time
to retrieve the publisher’s public key from the public key service cache.
B. Ad delivery process delay in programmatic platforms
To measure the overall additional delay introduced by
Ads.chain in the ad delivery process in programmatic pro-
cesses, we consider the case of the SSP in our lab prototype.
Note that results for other platforms will be similar to those
reported below.
We measure the time elapsed in the different tasks of
Ads.chain that the SSP performs. We consider different load
scenarios ranging between 23 and 350 requests per second,
which are equivalent to 2 M and 30 M ad requests per day,
respectively. For each specific load, we run one experiment
per metric of 10 thousand requests. We deployed the SSP,
AdX, and DSP in servers of 4 vcpus and let the whole chain
of messages to happen to replicate the load of a real process
in our measurements.
Figure 6 shows the 99 percentile of the delay added
by Ads.chain for all considered loads. The delay added by
Ads.chain is negligible (< 0.8 ms) in all cases at the 99
percentile. Moreover, the detailed analysis of the different
components of this delay reveals that the most time-consuming
task is the signature verification.
Based on this result, we conclude that Ads.chain has a
negligible impact on the operation of programmatic advertising
platforms.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we present Ads.chain, a protocol that provides
end-to-end traceability of individual ad transactions. It offers
the required scalability to operate in the current online ad-
vertising ecosystem. Moreover, it uses de-facto standard tech-
nologies (ad-tags and OpenRTB), guaranteeing an easy and
seamless integration in the current programmatic ecosystem.
Ads.chain extends the current effort of the IAB in providing
traceability in online advertising through the Ads.txt and
Ads.cert solutions. Ads.chain addresses the limitations of these
techniques and provides (to the best of the authors’ knowledge)
the first solution meeting the goal pursued by the IAB’s efforts
to provide end-to-end traceability to ad transactions.
We demonstrate through extensive lab experiments that the
impact of Ads.chain in the end-user experience browsing web
pages and the operation of online advertising intermediaries is
negligible.
Ads.chain code, as well as the additional code used for its
evaluation, are publicly available. We encourage the research
community and industry to provide feedback that helps to
improve our solution and to conduct further measurements re-
lated to its performance. Our current effort focuses on finding
interested stakeholders from the online advertising industry to
conduct trials in real systems. Additionally, we will work on
the definition of scalable auditing systems that automatically
analyze the signature chains generated by Ads.chain to identify
misbehaving entities.
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